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Chapter
3 Processes and mechanisms inneuropsychiatry: motor-executive processes
Nicole Rinehart, Phyllis Chua and John L. Bradshaw
Introduction
“The irritating historical division between neurology
and psychiatry is at its most arbitrary in the field
of movement disorders” (Lennox & Lennox, 2002,
p. 28).
The introduction and differentiation of “extrapy-
ramidal motor disorders” from “pyramidal disorders,”
by Wilson in 1912, heralded a major paradigm shift
(Rogers, 1992). Wilson conceptualized disorders that
had traditionally been regarded as “psychiatric” or
“functional,” such as Parkinson’s disease, as extra-
pyramidal. In addition, he also described a group of
patients with motor symptoms, the majority of whom
also experienced psychiatric symptoms with diag-
noses of hysteria or schizophrenia. Although neurol-
ogy and psychiatry have continued to develop along
separate lines, disorders such as Parkinson’s disease,
Huntington’s disease and Gilles de la Tourette
syndrome (GTS), which straddle the neurology and
psychiatry boundary, highlight the importance of
understanding both motor and psychological pro-
cesses in these and other conditions. This may offer
insight into the neural correlates and clinical manage-
ment of these disorders.
This chapter will discuss the relevance of the neu-
romotor circuitry and recent theoretical advances
in motor theories that relate to the underlying neuro-
pathophysiology of these disorders.
Neuromotor circuitry
The basal ganglia and cerebellum are key neural struc-
tures in the brain’s motor circuitry. The basal ganglia
are comprised of the caudate, putamen, globus pallidus
and substantia nigra. The caudate and putamen form
the striatum, and the putamen and globus pallidus are
referred to as the lentiform nucleus. Generally speak-
ing the striatum is the input layer of the basal ganglia
and lentiform nucleus the output layer. Basal ganglia
efferents are inhibitory to the thalamus. The cerebel-
lar hemispheres are functionally analogous input
layers of the cerebellum; however, unlike the striatum
which receives afferents directly from the cortices, the
cerebellum receives cortical input via pontine nuclei
that then project via mossy fibers to the cortex of the
cerebellum. The three deep cerebellar structures, the
fastigial, dentate and interposed nuclei, have excita-
tory projections to the thalamus and can be conceived
in simple terms as the output layer.
The basal ganglia and cerebellum both project via
the thalamus to widespread areas of the cortex, influ-
encing motor and cognitive functioning. Disorders
such as Parkinson’s disease and Huntington’s dis-
eases, with discrete and well-defined neuropathology,
have served as a model for basal ganglia dysfunction.
Similarly, diseases such as Friedreich’s ataxia with
known cerebellar pathology serve as models for cere-
bellar influence on the cortex. While the basal ganglia
play a central role in the initiation and mediation
of movements, the cerebellum is more involved in
controlling and tempering end-stage movement
(Bradshaw & Mattingley, 1995); for example, cerebel-
lar lesions result in movements which are inaccurate,
rough and variable (Robinson & Fuchs, 2001).
Although traditionally the roles of these structures
were conceived as purely motor, there is converging
evidence indicating damage to basal ganglia and cere-
bellum can have deleterious consequences for cogni-
tive functioning (Glickstein, 2006).
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Conceptual advances in motor theory:
affordances and mirror neurons, motor
control models
The general clumsiness (e.g. “dropping things”) so
often described in psychiatric disorders may eventu-
ally be more carefully re-defined and understood in
the context of “affordances.” Similarly, problems with
motor imitation skills may lead to motor learning
difficulties to be interpretable via the concept of
“mirror neurons.” Motor control models such as feed
forward, motor overflow and the role of top-down
influences, as well as attention, may contribute to
our understanding of the more complex motor
phenomena.
Affordances
The concept of two complementary visual systems
(Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982), a dorsal system
located in the posterior parietal cortex and a ventral
system located in the inferior occipito-temporal
cortex responsible for unconscious and conscious
object identification respectively, underlies the notion
of affordance. When picking up a cup, we typically do
so via the handle, not the body of the receptacle; many
such objects elicit “use-appropriate” hand postures,
reflecting the accessing of stored (“dorsal stream”)
information about object identity and potential util-
ity. Indeed, the central nervous system as a whole has
necessarily evolved in the service of potential action.
Such “preparation for action,” largely the province
of the dorsal stream, highlights an important new
theoretical concept of affordance, which is a central
component of ecological psychology (Gibson, 1979).
Affordances, generally, are properties of the environ-
ment taken relative to an observer’s standpoint.
Thus representations for action that are elicited by
an object’s visual affordance serve to potentiate motor
components (a specific hand position or posture
to adopt), so that a response and action is initiated.
Intraparietal regions may extract such affordance
information for the premotor cortex in due course
to initiate and execute appropriate action (Taira et al.,
1990). How we represent the sensory or perceptual
world arises partly from affordances using a reper-
toire of stored actions; actions that are developed on
the basis of interactions between the visual attributes
of an object and the conscious, deliberate and con-
textually relevant goal of the observer. An object’s
possibilities for action, namely its affordances, are
built directly into its perceptual representation.
Therefore, perceptual and motor processes are inex-
tricably linked, i.e. perception as potential or implicit
action, and action in a perceptually relevant context.
Indeed, according to this view, objects may potentiate
a range of actions associated with them, irrespective
of the intentions of the viewer.
When such potentiation overrides intentionality,
we may see utilization behavior; this can occur when
distractedly picking up and toying with an object, or
when prefrontal damage and inhibitory dysfunction
are present. Following bilateral medial frontal lobe
damage the patient may display a compulsive, inap-
propriate urge to use objects in sight. Such utilization
behavior is thought to manifest from a supervisory-
system deficit (Della Sala, 2005; Frith et al., 2000).
The patient may offer confabulatory explanations
for such behavior, given that they often seem unaware
of the inappropriateness of the behavior. This situ-
ation of course contrasts with our own realization
when abstractedly and absent-mindedly, for example,
taking off all our clothes when we only intended to
change our socks.
An extreme example of such behavior is the
anarchic hand phenomenon. While patients after pa-
rietal damage with optic ataxia (Balint’s syndrome,
see Perenin & Vighetto, 1988) or certain forms of
apraxia have great difficulty picking up, grasping or
manipulating objects which they can see quite clearly,
patients showing the anarchic hand sign may com-
plain that a hand makes apparently purposeful, com-
plex, smooth and well-formed movements of its own
accord, and quite contrary to the patient’s own inten-
tion or will (Della Sala, 2005). The patients are aware
of their limb’s bizarre and potentially hazardous
behavior, but cannot inhibit it. They often refer to
the feeling that one of their hands behaves as if it had
a will of its own, but never deny that this capricious
hand is part of their own body – as can happen with
severe unilateral neglect (Parton et al., 2004). Thus
self-ownership of actions is apparently separable from
awareness of actions; affected patients are aware of
their anarchic hand, which they know is part of their
own anatomy and not a robotic counterfeit, yet they
disown its actions. Affected patients typically have
medial frontal lobe damage, in the vicinity of the
supplementary motor area (SMA), on the side con-
tralateral to the wayward hand. The SMA is known
(Cunnington et al., 1996) to be responsible for
Section 1: Neuropsychological processes
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converting self-generated (as opposed to externally
initiated) intentions into self-initiated action se-
quences or motor subroutines related to internal
drives. Environmentally relevantmovement sequences
can, instead, be initiated by the alternative, lateral,
premotor system. This system, remaining intact in
the patient with an anarchic hand, will now take over
and drive the patient’s hand, to their consternation,
according to triggering events or objects encountered
in the external environment. Note that the term “alien
hand,” often used as a synonym for the anarchic
hand (Marchetti & Della Sala, 1998), means a range
of different things to different authors, and perhaps is
best seen as uncooperative behavior or posturing by a
hand which especially is felt to be somehow foreign to
or “estranged” from its owner (hemisomatognosia),
and may or may not require alternative (to SMA
involvement) or additional callosal damage (Bundick
& Spinella, 2000; Chan & Liu, 1999).
Mirror neurons
This essential and inextricably linked interrelatedness
of perception and action is also played out in the recent
discovery and account ofmirror neurons (Arbib, 2005;
Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). Canonical neurons,
abundant in the rear section of the monkey’s arcuate
sulcus (part of area F5), may fire whenever a particular
object is seen, as a function of its shape, size and spatial
orientation. They may also fire when an animal is
presented with a graspable object, irrespective of
whether this is followed up by an actual grasping
response (cf. the concept of affordances, above), or
alternatively when a specific response or response
sequence is initiated. They do not fire, however, when
the individual merely observes actions performed by
another. Conversely,mirror neurons, first identified in
the convexity of area F5 of the primate frontal cortex,
and now thought to be widely distributed in the brain,
are active both when the monkey performs certain
actions, and when they observe actions performed by
another monkey or person. In this way, unlike canon-
ical neurons, mirror neurons do not respond when
objects alone are presented (Rizzolatti & Craighero,
2004). Mirror neurons represent a mechanism for
object-directed action capable of coupling the obser-
vation of another’s actions and their execution, as if
they were performing the actions observed themselves.
Consequently, we must now add a third term
to the relation between perception and action;
simulation. Understanding others’ beliefs, intentions
and actions is an important social ability – “theory of
mind” – possibly deficient in certain developmental
disorders of the fronto-striatal system such as autism
(Happe, 1999) and schizophrenia (Brune, 2005).
While a mere visual representation, without involve-
ment of the motor system, can describe the superfi-
cial, visible aspects of another agent’s movement, it
fails to provide information critical for understanding
“action semantics” (Nelissen et al., 2005). That is,
what the action concerns, its goal and context.
Likewise action information, without knowledge con-
cerning object identity, again can only tell half the
story. We need to combine information about object
identity with semantic information about the action.
This may be the role of mirror neurons, in matching
observed actions with their corresponding internal
motor representations. Nelissen et al. (2005) report
that the monkey’s frontal lobe hosts multiple repre-
sentations of others’ actions. Representations located
caudally in F5 seem to be context-dependent, acti-
vated only when the agent is seen, while representa-
tions in rostral F5 and prefrontally code the action. In
humans area 44, a probable homolog of monkey F5,
plays a fundamental role in speech; the motor theory
of speech perception (Liberman et al., 1967) posits an
active, if tacit, recreation of the speaker’s articulatory
intentions. Parenthetically, it is also noteworthy that
the canonical neurons of monkey F5 receive input
from the anterior parietal sulcus in the form of neural
codes for affordances e.g. grasping (Taira et al., 1990).
While the classical studies of the mirror system
indicate that some of the same motor regions are
activated both when performing and when observing
a movement, there is also evidence that such motor
activity may even occur prior to observing another’s
action. Thus the mere knowledge of the likelihood of
another’s upcoming movement may be sufficient to
excite the observer’s mirror-motor system (Kilner
et al., 2004). This would enable (as in the motor
theory of speech perception) one to anticipate rather
than to merely react to another’s actions.
Neurons responding to the observation of actions
done by others are not present only in area F5. Move-
ments effective in eliciting neural responses in the
cortex of the superior temporal sulcus include
walking, turning the head, bending the torso, and
goal-directed hand and arm movements (Rizzolatti &
Craighero, 2004). However, the mirror system may
not necessarily be restricted to motor functions.
Chapter 3: Processes and mechanisms in neuropsychiatry
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Blakemore et al. (2005) report a new form of
synesthesia, where visual perception of touch elicited
conscious tactile experiences in the observer. This
may have occurred because the mirror system for
touch (parietal and premotor cortices and superior
temporal sulcus) proved overactive (as shown by
fMRI) and above the normal threshold for conscious
tactile perception. Pain, too, when observed in others,
may excite the observer’s mirror system and lead to
painful sensations (Avenanti et al., 2005; Bradshaw &
Mattingley, 1995). As Singer & Frith (2005) note, we
all have a remarkable and largely involuntary capacity
to share the experience of others; for example, yawns
are infectious, and we wince when we see another
person trap her fingers in a door.
Two main hypotheses have been advanced on the
underlying function of mirror neurons; they might
mediate imitation or more likely are the basis of
action understanding (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004).
Each time an individual sees an action performed
by another, neurons representing that action are
activated in the observer’s premotor cortex. This
automatically induced motor representation of the
observed action corresponds to the representation
that is spontaneously executed during self-generated
action. Thus, a role of the mirror system can be
regarded as the transformation of visual information
into knowledge, and actions performed by another
become messages that are understood without
any cognitive mediation. On the basis of this, the
mirror-neuron system provides a potential mecha-
nism from which language may have evolved, prob-
ably via an oral-manual stage. The mirror neuron
hypotheses have been used to explain the diverse
motor, social and communicative impairments which
characterize pervasive developmental disorders (see
Williams et al., 2001), and may be invoked to account
for neuromotor impairments which we see across
the psychiatry spectrum.
Motor control models
Feed forward models
Prior knowledge can also enable us to predict the
sensory changes resulting from movements. The “for-
ward model” proposes that prior knowledge based on
intended actions can modify perception. The “for-
ward dynamic model” allows the prediction of the
trajectory of the limb movement in space and time,
whilst the “forward output model” predicts the
tactile and kinesthetic sensations resulting from the
movement (Frith, 2005). Environmentally appropri-
ate responding towards a goal demands production
and control of sequences of requisite muscle contrac-
tions, in the context of initial sensory input and
feedback that is consequent upon action. Note must
also be made of the current configurations of joint
angles and limb postures prior to implementation of
the motor commands (Frith et al., 2000). Just prior to
movement initiation, a predictor, receiving an effer-
ence copy from the initiating motor system, estimates
the movements’ likely sensory consequences (reaffer-
ence). In this way compensation can be made for the
sensory effects of movement and, secondly, in the
event of response error, corrections can be initiated.
Several studies have shown that forward model-
ling is abnormal in patients with schizophrenia when
they have to consciously attend to their actions; how-
ever no abnormalities in implicit, automatic use of
forward modelling such as anticipatory adjustments
of grip force when picking up objects were noted in
such patients. Different areas may be involved: the
frontal cortex for initiating actions, the sensory areas
to process the consequences of actions, and the ante-
rior cingulate cortex to detect discrepancies. Discon-
nections between these brain areas may explain the
different symptoms reported in schizophrenia (Frith,
2005), and disconnections between the frontal and
parietal regions may account for the misperception
of limb positions in delusions of control. The absence
of delusional explanations in neurological patients
with lesions in these brain regions, e.g. anarchic hand
after parietal lobe lesions, is noteworthy. Additional
concepts such as “intentional binding” which draws
together cause and effect in perceived time may
bridge such gaps. Intentional binding occurs when,
for example, we put together cause (e.g. we push a
button or watch someone else push a button) and
effect (e.g. the resulting sound). There may be exagger-
ated intentional binding in patients with schizophre-
nia, perhaps explaining incorrect attribution of agency
in those with delusions of control or persecution.
Motor control and attention
While we can attend to and be aware of our intended
movements and perform movement sequences in
imagination; fast, overlearnt and automatic respond-
ing is typically best achieved below the level of con-
scious awareness. We may only be aware of our
Section 1: Neuropsychological processes
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movements when they deviate from what we intend
or expect to occur.
It may be that young people with motor coordi-
nation problems who have difficulty with automatic
responding (e.g. catching a ball) are processing at a
more conscious level that results in a slowed, awk-
ward motor response falling short of the target behav-
ior. Operating at a more conscious level in this way
would perhaps place greater demands on the atten-
tional and executive control centers of the brain (i.e.
the prefrontal and cortico-thalamo-cortical circuitry),
which are typically impaired in neurodevelopmental
disorders.
This fits with the phenomenon of kinesia para-
doxa, where “the individual who typically experiences
severe difficulties with the most simple of move-
ments” (e.g. running) “may suddenly perform com-
plex, skilled movements” (e.g. running and trying to
get a ball) (Leary & Hill, 1996, p. 41). For example,
individuals with Asperger’s disorder have been
described as showing considerable dexterity in draw-
ing, model building, or playing a computer game
(particularly if the topic is one of special interest,
and therefore benefits from the child’s directed atten-
tion) (Leary & Hill, 1996). Yet, they show abnormal-
ities in everyday, simple motor tasks such as walking
or catching a ball, often appearing uncoordinated and
clumsy. It may be that individuals with autism or
Asperger’s disorder exhibit more skillful movement
on these (seemingly) more difficult tasks because
attention becomes more focused, either because they
become obsessed with a particular motor task (e.g.
computer games) or more complex tasks have more
cues embedded (e.g. verbal instructions, visual cues)
to focus the individual’s attention, which enables
motor functioning to become automated.
These observations suggest that prefrontal input
(mediating focused attention) to the cerebellum and
possibly basal ganglia are able to play an important
modulatory role in motor behavior. In addition the
thalamus, an area that is neuroanatomically anom-
alous in autism (Tsatsanis et al., 2003), has major
connections to both the cerebellum and basal ganglia
fronto-striatal circuitry; it has also been implicated
in such paradoxical motor improvements when com-
promised and may play a mediating role in such
“kinesia paradoxa” (Mennemeier et al., 1996).
Our understanding of how attentional focus inter-
acts with motor functioning is at the heart of under-
standing how movement abnormalities may translate
to functional impairment in a psychiatric context.
Unlike the movement disorder of more classic neuro-
logical disorders such as Parkinson’s disease, move-
ment disorders that appear in a developmental
psychiatric context, with multiple circuitry involve-
ment (e.g. involving the thalamus, basal ganglia, cere-
bellum, fronto-striatal region) are less likely to be
“fixed” (e.g. shuffling, uncoordinated gait) or “con-
sistent” (e.g. continually postured arms), and may be
more contextually dependent.
Motor overflow
Motor overflow refers to the involuntary movement
which can sometimes accompany voluntary move-
ment. Three forms of motor overflow have been
described: (1) associated movement when involuntary
movement occurs in non-homologous muscles in
either the ipsilateral or contralateral limbs; (2) contra-
lateral mirror movement when directly observable
involuntary movements occur in homologous muscles
contralateral to the voluntary movements; and (3)
contralateral motor irradiation when involuntary
movements detected on electromyogram occur in
homologous muscles contralateral to the voluntary
movements (Hoy et al., 2004). Most theories on the
etiology of motor overflow such as transcallosal facili-
tation and ipsilateral activation theory have focused
on potential cortical origins, although the possibility
of subcortical contribution remains. Motor overflow
has been described in several populations including
normal adults under effortful conditions, children
under the age of ten, and the elderly, and is pro-
nounced in Huntington’s disease, Parkinson’s disease,
obsessive-compulsive disorder and schizophrenia. In
Huntington’s disease, abnormal intracortical inhibi-
tion and resultant disinhibition of ipsilateral descend-
ing fibers have been postulated to be responsible
for the motor overflow (Hoy et al., 2004). In contrast,
there is evidence of corpus callosum abnormalities
in patients with schizophrenia, which can result in
greater transcallosal facilitation (Hoy et al., 2004).
Neuromotor dysfunction and mental
disorders
Disorders usually first diagnosed in infancy,
childhood or adolescence
Neuromotor soft signs identified in early childhood
(e.g. 6–10 years of age) are now increasingly
Chapter 3: Processes and mechanisms in neuropsychiatry
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recognized as an early marker of various developmen-
tal problems and later-onset psychiatric disorders
(Bergman et al., 1997). As movement is affected by
the aberrant neurodevelopmental processes which
appear to be associated with, and in some cases
define, many early-onset psychiatric disorders, neuro-
motor assessment tasks have much to offer in the
way of improving diagnostic definition and concep-
tualizations of comorbidity. Neuromotor assessment
tools may also act as important neurobiological
probes to brain dysfunction in disorders where
imaging has so far been unable to make strong
inroads into neuropathological processes. Thus, while
neuromotor assessment may, on the surface, seem
more at home with the study of “frank” movement
disorders, such as Parkinson’s and Huntington’s dis-
ease, it is perhaps the neurodevelopmental psychiatric
disorders associated with much less obvious struc-
tural and discernable functional brain abnormality,
which may stand to benefit the most from such
investigations.
The majority of childhood psychiatric disorders
involve motor disturbance to a greater (e.g. autism) or
lesser degree (e.g. learning disabilities). The inclusion
of a seemingly “neurological” condition such as
Developmental coordination disorder (DCD) in the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM – IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association,
2000), underscores Lennox & Lennox’s (2002) point
about the “irritating historical division between
neurology and psychiatry . . .” (p. 28). Developmental
coordination disorder involves a range of possible
disruptions to motor development and activities
including delays in meeting motor milestones (e.g.
sitting, crawling and walking), general clumsiness
(e.g. “dropping things”), subaverage performance in
sports and/or poor handwriting. It is interesting to
note that disorders such as autism and Asperger’s
disorder, both associated with movement dis-
orders, cannot be comorbidly diagnosed with DCD.
Attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), on
the other hand, a disorder which also involves marked
motor coordination impairment (Barkley, 1997), can
be comorbid with DCD, but not with autism and
Asperger’s disorder. The issue of comorbidity has
been described as an “important if vexatious issue in
psychopathology” (Bradshaw, 2001, p. 259). It may be
that movement coordination problems are a risk
factor for a multitude of psychiatric disorders
which involve “extrapyramidal” structures such as
the basal ganglia and cerebellum. These structures
form cortico-thalamo-cortical re-entrant loops and
play a key role in selecting, inhibiting, releasing,
filtering, modulating and automatizing cognitive-
motor function (Bradshaw, 2001). There is a poten-
tial relationship between concomitant comorbid
conditions and greater involvement of the cortico-
thalamo-cortical circuitry (Bradshaw, 2001). It is
not uncommon to find that an individual with
autism or Asperger’s disorder may show clinically
significant signs of motor coordination disorder,
ADHD, depression and anxiety (Tonge et al., 1999).
In relation to pervasive developmental disorders,
in particular autism and Asperger’s disorder, there
has been much speculation about several issues
including: the validity of separate diagnostic labeling,
issues of diagnostic comorbidity, the role of move-
ment abnormality in the clinical expression of the
disorders, and the role of the basal ganglia and cere-
bellum. As a result these disorders are perhaps the
best “model” to exemplify how neuromotor investi-
gation has advanced, and may further advance, clin-
ical child psychiatry and psychology.
Case focus: autism and Asperger’s disorder.
An example of how neuromotor
investigation has the potential to offer new
insights into etiology and diagnosis
The clinical focus in disorders such as autism and
Asperger’s disorder has traditionally been directed to
the more salient social and communicative impair-
ments. Research criteria in DSM–IV-TR separates
children with autism and Asperger’s disorder based
on language and intellectual functioning criteria.
There is a tendency for individuals diagnosed with
Asperger’s disorder to continue to be conceptualized
as having a “milder” variant of autism, with the terms
Asperger’s disorder (AD) and high-functioning
autism (HFA) often used interchangeably.
Instrumented gait analysis may play an important
adjunctive role in the assessment and differential
diagnosis of psychiatric disorders. In the context of
autism and AD this approach has revealed distinct
patterns of cerebellar gait variability which are a dis-
tinguishing feature of autism (cf: non-clinical popula-
tions) in children from 4–6 years of age (usual age of
diagnosis) through to adolescence (Rinehart et al.,
2006c, 2006d). Moreover, there is some evidence that
Section 1: Neuropsychological processes
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atypical movement disturbances impacting on
crawling may be observable in autism as young as
infancy, and appear before the diagnostically relevant
social-communicative signs (Teitelbaum et al., 1998).
Similar retrospective findings have been reported
in the schizophrenia literature (Schiffman et al.,
2004). The observation that autism is associated with
greater “cerebellar” gait variability than AD (the latter
is perhaps more a basal ganglia fronto-striatal gait
disorder) is consistent with the general body of
research which has particularly focused on cerebellar
deficits in autism (Courchesne, 1999). This is also
consistent with upper-body kinematic analysis
which reveals that individuals with autism, but not
Asperger’s disorder, show cerebellar-like deficits in
accurately modulating later stages of movement in
order to efficiently “home-in” on targets (Rinehart
et al., 2006a).
DSM-IV-TR only hints that motor functioning is
differentially affected by these disorders; for example,
“motor clumsiness and awkwardness” (p. 81) is
described as a feature of Asperger’s disorder, and
“abnormalities of posture” (for example, walking on
tiptoe, odd hand movements and body postures)
(p. 71) as a feature of autistic disorder. Neuromotor
investigations, however, may more accurately dissoci-
ate between these disorders. For example, in contrast
to the DSM-IV-TR description above, blindly rated
video observational analysis by gait experts has
revealed that both autism and AD may be associated
with motor clumsiness; however, AD may be dissoci-
ated from autism more on the basis of abnormalities
in terms of head and trunk posture (Rinehart et al.,
2006b). These observable upper-body postural abnor-
malities fit well with Damasio & Maurer’s (1978)
“Parkinsonian” view of autism, given the putative role
of the basal ganglia in regulating postural alignment
and axial motor control (Morris & Iansek, 1996).
A key feature of basal ganglia dysfunction is that it
leads to a failure to maintain preparedness for move-
ment (“motor set”), and is thought to result clinically
in a mismatch between desired and actual movement
(Morris & Iansek, 1996). Anecdotally, individuals
with HFA (and AD) report difficulty in playing
sport because there is a mismatch between wanting
to “catch a ball” and actually catching the ball, noting
that they tend to “duck” from the ball or move
away at the last minute. Analysis of movement-
related-potential activity (MRPs) over the supplemen-
tary motor area (a region which receives main input
from basal ganglia via the thalamus, and outputs to
the primary motor cortex and back to the basal gan-
glia) reveals a reduced early component of the MRP
similar to that observed in patients with Parkinson’s
disease (Cunnington et al., 1995); this is consistent
with the suggestion that autism may be associated
with difficulties in maintaining adequate “motor
set.” The finding of normal post-movement MRP
activity, which contrasts with Parkinson’s disease
(Cunnington et al., 1995), suggests the presence of
an intact “motor cue” for efficient running of well-
learned motor sequences, and is consistent with clin-
ical observation that individuals with autism do not
have difficulty with well-learnedmovement sequences.
Disorders usually first diagnosed in late
adolescence and adulthood
The role of neuromotor investigation is well estab-
lished in psychiatric research of adult mental dis-
orders. A detailed criticism of these findings in
specific disorders will be covered in later chapters.
Neuromotor dysfunction in adult mental disorders
ranges from soft signs to more defined phenomena.
In 1874, Kahlbaum described catatonia as an “insan-
ity of tension” (Pfuhlmann & Stöber, 2001) referring
to the abnormal mental and motor manifestations
which he considered as a distinct clinical entity. Con-
temporary psychiatric classification systems such as
ICD–10 and DSM–IV consider catatonia as a subtype
of schizophrenia, despite the occurrence of catatonic
features in affective and medical conditions.
The interrelated nature of motor and psychiatric
phenomena is revealed in the observations of abnor-
mal activity ranging from seemingly aimless pacing,
restlessness or over- or under-activity, to more seem-
ingly purposeful behaviors such as compulsive
touching, self-mutilation and aggressive behaviors in
patients with severe psychiatric disorders preceding
the introduction of neuroleptics in 1954 (Rogers,
1992). The side-effects associated with the introduc-
tion of neuroleptics to treat psychosis, i.e. dystonia,
akinesia and tardive dyskinesia, as well as antiparkin-
sonian medications to treat Parkinson’s disease, i.e.
psychoses, visual hallucinations and acute brain syn-
drome, only serve to emphasize the integral role of
the basal ganglia and associated circuits in both
groups of disorder. Oculomotor disturbances in these
disorders suggest involvement of the dopaminergic
system and frontal lobe.
Chapter 3: Processes and mechanisms in neuropsychiatry
31
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511642197.006
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Deakin University, Australia (Journals), on 18 Jun 2018 at 23:01:06, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
A case exemplar of neuromotor and psychiatric
abnormality is Gilles de la Tourette’s syndrome
(GTS), which is characterized by multiple vocal and
motor tics and accompanied by many comorbid
behavioral and cognitive problems such as obsessive-
compulsive disorder, ADHD, learning difficulties,
depression and anxiety (Bradshaw, 2001). The tics
are preceded by an increasing sensation of tension
relieved upon their release, which is often forceful
and potentially self-injurious. Tics may be briefly
suppressed or incorporated into a seemingly pur-
poseful movement. Although not common, GTS is
often associated with repetitive or obscene gestures
or speech such as echopraxia, echolalia, palilalia,
copropraxia and coprolalia. Not surprisingly, a disin-
hibitory response to the Simon task in the incongruent
condition has been observed in GTS (Bradshaw, 2001).
Deficits in visuomotor integration tasks such as Rey
Osterrieth Complex Figure copying have been consis-
tently reported (Bradshaw, 2001). It is unclear whether
deficits on motor tasks, such as Purdue Pegboard or
finger tapping, are secondary to this visuomotor
integration deficit. Eye movement abnormalities have
also been found. The occurrence of tics in other patho-
logical conditions affecting this region such as carbon
monoxide poisoning, encephalitis lethargica (Stern,
2000) and volumetric changes in the basal ganglia sup-
port a basal ganglia dysfunction theory. All evidence
indicates failure of the striatopallidal gating of motor,
cognitive and limbic pathways resulting in the inability
to suppress impulsivity. Amore complex model involv-
ing aberrant activity in the sensorimotor, executive,
language and paralimbic circuits has been suggested
by PET studies (Stern, 2000).
Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is often
seen as the cognitive counterpart of GTS, although
there are important differences such as the ideational
component and the overfocusing of attention in
OCD. The main symptoms of OCD are recurrent,
intrusive thoughts, impulses or images (obsessions)
often accompanied by ritualistic behaviors (compul-
sions) that cannot be resisted without increasing anx-
iety. Recent research has hinted at subtle differences
in OCD populations depending on the presence of
tics or soft neurological signs. Tic-related OCD has an
earlier onset in childhood, is commoner in boys and
responds less well to selective serotonin inhibitors
alone (Bradshaw, 2001). The content of the OCD
symptoms varies depending on the presence or
absence of tics, with contamination themes and
rituals being more common in non tic-related OCD,
and the need to touch or rub, blinking or staring
rituals, the need for symmetry, and intrusive aggres-
sive images being more common in OCD with
comorbid tics. Kinematic analysis of handwriting to
assess subtle motor dysfunction found differences
between responders and non-responders to combined
sertraline and behavior therapy (Mergl, 2005).
The high prevalence of depression in motor dis-
orders such as Parkinson’s disease, Huntington’s dis-
ease and Wilson’s disease, as well as the recognition of
the psychomotor symptoms of depression, have led to
increased interest in using these specific basal ganglia
diseases as models to study depression (Sobin, 1998).
Some researchers continue to argue that the incidence
of depression in these motor disorders is a psycho-
logical reaction to a chronic illness, whilst others view
the depression and the motor manifestations equally
as manifestations of underlying brain abnormalities.
The observation that depression can precede the onset
of motor symptoms of Huntington’s disease by many
years, and can occur in those who may not be aware
of their being at risk for the disorder, provides sup-
port for the latter (Peyser & Folstein, 1990). The view
that depression is reactive to stress and has no under-
lying cerebral pathology should therefore be rejected.
The psychomotor symptoms observed in major
depression including slowed movement, shuffling
gait, stooped posture, soft and monotonous speech,
facial immobility and purposeless movements of the
limbs and trunk, closely mimic the symptoms of
Parkinson’s disease. Psychomotor retardation has
been correlated with reduced blood flow in the left
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and left angu-
lar gyrus (Bench, 1993). Similar neuroimaging find-
ings in patients with diminished speech in aphasia
and chronic schizophrenia implicate the role of the
left DLPFC in volitional and intentional activities, and
in interconnecting with the anterior cingulate. The
angular gyrus plays an important role in visuospatial
orientation and attention. In contrast, marked motor
agitation has been associated with increased blood
flow in the inferior parietal lobe and the cingulate
cortex, which plays a role in drive and affect and
connects with the higher association cortex (Bench,
1993). Neuropsychological deficits of executive dys-
function in major depression provide further support
for involvement of the frontostriatal circuit in some
subtypes of major depression (Bradshaw, 2001). Simi-
lar neuroimaging and neurocognitive findings in
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schizophrenia (described in Chapter 26) also implicate
frontostriatal circuit abnormalities (Pantelis et al.
1992, 1997).
The significance of other motor abnormalities
co-existing with other psychiatric phenomena is less
well-defined. Neurological soft signs characterized by
abnormalities in motor, sensory and integrative func-
tions have been used as probes for non-specific cen-
tral nervous system defects. Neurological soft signs in
schizophrenia have been linked with genetic and
environmental factors, such as intrauterine and peri-
natal trauma, and are hypothesized as non-specific
markers of vulnerability to psychoses. A better under-
standing of the presence of neurological soft signs
in other mental disorders as diverse as antisocial
personality disorder (Lindberg et al., 2004) and post-
traumatic stress disorder (Gurvits et al., 1997) may
elucidate the underlying pathology of these disorders
that have traditionally been regarded as falling more
into the psychiatric realm.
Neuromotor assessment and research
Formal neurological examination including gait anal-
ysis and assessment for extrapyramidal symptoms
as markers of basal ganglia involvement, e.g. muscular
rigidity, bradykinesia, resting tremor and flexion
posture, is an important part of neuropsychiatric assess-
ment. Instruments such as the Geriatric Movement
Disorders Assessment that include ratings on the
Simpson Extrapyramidal Side Effect Scale (Simpson &
Angus, 1970), the Abnormal Involuntary Movement
Scale and the Neurological Evaluation Scale and
Unified Huntington’s Disease Rating Scale, can all pro-
vide quantitative measures for use in research. A variety
of tools such as ambulatory activity monitors with solid
state memory, along with kinematic analysis of hand-
writing using digitizing graphic tablets (Mergl, 2005),
the Purdue Pegboard, and other reaction-timed and
motor-coordination tasks can enhance and quantify
clinically observable and more subtle motor behaviors.
While in the past instrumented neurological
examination (e.g. gait analysis) and EEG have been
described as “non-contributory” (p. 64) in a develop-
mental psychiatric assessment context (Graham et al.,
2001), it might be that the future coupling of EEG and
movement tasks, together with systematic gait analy-
sis using clinical technologies that are commercially
available, may greatly improve our definition of
early-onset psychiatric disorders.
Other relatively new technologies such as trans-
cranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) also open up new
possibilities for investigating psychiatric disorders.
Transcranial magnetic stimulation is a non-invasive
means of stimulating nerve cells (in excitatory or
inhibitory fashion) in superficial areas of the brain,
providing a powerful method for the study of motor
cortical function. Transcranial magnetic stimulation
applied to the motor cortex of human subjects has
been extensively used to investigate normal motor
cortical physiology and disease states (Fitzgerald
et al., 2002). Transcranial magnetic stimulation
methods have a significant advantage over other
methods of assessment of motor function as they are
completely independent of motivation, attention and
other elements of higher cognitive function (Fitzger-
ald et al., 2002). Possible comorbid impairments must
be taken into account when we are assessing neuro-
motor functioning in a psychiatric context.
Eye movements “whose premotor structures and
descending commands are the best understood of any
motor system” may also play a role in expanding our
clinical and neurobiological understanding of psychi-
atric disorders (Robinson & Fuchs, 2001). The most
important advantage of applying this approach to
these complex cognitive–motor disorders is that the
ocular motor system, truly a window directly in to the
brain, has a reduced number of degrees of freedom of
movement and little in the way of plastic or inertial
forces. Therefore, output closely mirrors the com-
mand signals and the cognitive influences on them.
While conventional clinical diagnosis of early-
onset psychiatric disorders may take place informally
(e.g. observation of skills during play, drawing),
and sometimes with the use of standardized tests of
motor ability such as the Bruininks–Osertesky test
(Bruininks, 1978) and the Movement Assessment
Battery for Children (Henderson & Sugden, 1992),
future diagnosis of these disorders may include
instrumented gait analysis, motor cortical EEG analy-
sis, TMS, and ocular motor assessment; all of which
will shed greater light on the neurobiological under-
pinnings of these disorders and thereby have early
intervention and management implications.
Summary
The etiological relevance of neuromotor dysfunction
has now been established as a key focus of clinical
research for a number of psychiatric disorders such as
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autism and schizophrenia. Renewed interest in the
application of neuromotor assessment in the psychi-
atric arena occurs in parallel to critical developments
in our understanding of the neural connectivity of the
prefrontal cortex, basal ganglia and cerebellum
(Hoshi et al., 2005). Conceptual advances have been
made in our understanding of higher-order awareness
and control of “action,” mirror neurons, the concept
of affordances, utilization behavior, and extreme
neurological motor conditions such as the anarchic
hand, all of which may form part of the larger land-
scape for understanding the complex cognitive–
motor processing dysfunctions that occurs in people
with mental illness.
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